THE MIZAN NEWSLETTER

Vol. 2 No. 2 February 1960

The Mizan Newsletter aims at giving an objective and balanced account of current Soviet writings on the Middle East

---

The first article in this issue is the first of a series which will examine Soviet Views on Turkey. It traces the development of Soviet views on Turkey from the beginning of the Turkish revolution until the second World War; the Soviet attitude towards Turkey's conduct in the war, with particular reference to the question of the Straits; and the emergence of the present Soviet attitude towards Turkey since Turkey's acceptance of US aid in 1947.

Persian Oil Today: A Soviet Picture is an account of Soviet articles written on the fifth aniversary of the consortium agreement of 1954. Soviet writers complain not only that the consortium agreement was contrary to Persia's interests but also that it has been deliberately violated by the consortium companies and that the latter's treatment of their Persian employees is inhuman. Appended is a note on a recent Soviet study of the events which led up to the Persian oil nationalization law.

The leading topics in Soviet Angle on the News are the start of work on the first stage of the Aswan High Dam and the announcement that the Soviet Union is to undertake the second stage of the project also.

Soviet appeals to the spirit of Turkish-Soviet friendship have been not infrequent in recent years. On 29th December 1955, in a speech to the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev regretted that the "very good relations" which had existed between Turkey and the USSR when Ataturk and Inonu were at the helm had since become clouded - partly, he said, as a result of certain "inappropriate statements" (neumestnyye zayavleniya) by the Soviet side. In a message to Menderes on 10th September 1957 Bulganin recalled the warm friendship which existed between Turkey and the Soviet Union at the time when "Kemal Ataturk courageously raised high the banner of the independence of Turkey, which then shone brightly throughout the East as the banner of freedom and independence for the peoples of the East from the colonialists". On 31st October 1959, in a speech to the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev deplored the present orientation of Turkey's foreign policy and said that the Soviet side had "submitted concrete proposals" with a view to improving relations; "we sincerely want our relations to be built in the spirit of friendliness and co-operation which characterized the fairly recent past when so outstanding a figure as Kemal Ataturk determined Turkey's policy."

However, in the same speech of 31st October 1959 Khrushchev also spoke of the present Turkish Government in a far from flattering manner. Turkey, he said, had joined NATO and CENTO and was presumably only deterred by the distance from joining SEATO; "I think one would only have to promise a sum of money to the present ruling circles of Turkey for them gladly to join SEATO or any other 'ATO'." This remark has prompted some offensive cartoons in Soviet newspapers, depicting heavily armed Turks in uniform, being lured onwards by bags of dollars dangled before their eyes, with new military burdens awaiting round the corner (BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY 12.11.59; IZVESTIYA 18.11.59).

This alternation between friendly overtures and insulting or at least disparaging comments is characteristic of the present Soviet attitude towards Turkey. One may well ask which of these two elements is the permanent and significant one. The fact is, however, that each has a tradition behind it; there has been an inherent duality in the Soviet approach from the outset of Soviet-Turkish relations.

Traditions of Soviet Turkish friendship The history of Soviet-Turkish relations has been much written about in the Soviet Union, in both learned and popular publications. In 1958, for example, the Soviet Institute of Oriental Studies published a study by A.M. Shamsutdinov on the Soviet-Turkish Agreement of 1921 and two studies by M.A. Kerimov on the relations between the Soviet Transcaucasian Republics and Turkey in 1922-3. In the same year P. Moiseyev and Yu. Rozaliyev published their short but well-documented HISTORY OF SOVIET-TURKISH RELATIONS; and the Soviet monthly

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (February) in an appendix published documents illustrating the friendly relations existing between Moscow and Ankara in 1920-1922. (It may here be remarked that the volume of general Soviet writing on Turkey is very large, and the number of Soviet experts on Turkey is considerable.)

Soviet writers make much of the mutual attraction of the revolutionary regimes of Russia and Turkey after the first World War. The Turkish Revolution, it is claimed, would not have been possible without the Russian Revolution. Soviet histories quote the appeal to all Muslim working people of Russia and the East, published by the Soviet revolutionary Government in December 1917, which denounced Tsarist secret agreements and declared that Constantinople "must remain in the hands of the Muslims" - a declaration which was reaffirmed by Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, in an appeal to the workers and peasants of Turkey published on 13th September 1919. On the Turkish side the first landmark was the letter sent by Mustafa Kemal to Lenin on 26th April 1920, three days after Kemal set up his first Government; Kemal asked for the aid and collaboration of "the Russian Bolsheviks, whose aim is struggle against the imperialist Governments and the liberation of all the oppressed from their power". Later, in a letter to Chicherin on 29th November 1920, Kemal again suggested that Turkey and Russia had the same revolutionary aims, and expressed anti-bourgeois sentiments:

> "I am deeply convinced - and my conviction is shared by all my countrymen - that on the day when the working people of the West, on the one hand, and the enslaved peoples of Asia and Africa, on the other, understand that international capital is today using them for mutual annihilation and enslavement for the greater benefit of their masters, the day when the criminality of colonial policy is realized by the mass of the working people the world over, bourgeois rule will end."

Soviet writers point to the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of 1921 as confirming Russia's support for the new Turkey, particularly by its denunciation of limitations on Turkey's independence such as the capitulations regime and by its solemn declaration of Russia's desire to see the Turkish people free and independent under a Government of their own choosing; "for the first time in the history of Turkey a great power concluded a treaty which took into consideration the interests of the Turkish people" (P. Moiseyev and Yu. Rozaliyev, op. cit.). Soviet writers trace the subsequent development of Soviet-Turkish relations during the 1920s and 1930s: Turkey's treaty of 13th October 1921 with the Soviet Republics of Azerbaydzhan, Armenia and Georgia, and the treaty with the Ukrainian SSR signed on 2nd January 1922; Soviet support for Turkish claims at the Lausanne Conference of 1922-3; the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of December 1925; the visits of Litvinov to Ankara in 1931, of Inonu to Moscow in 1932 and of Voroshilov to Ankara in 1933; the 10-year extension in 1935 of the Treaty

of Friendship and Neutrality; and active Soviet-Turkish trade relations during this period, with trade agreements signed in 1927 and 1937.

Soviet views of the Kemalist regime However, Moiseyev and Rozaliyev point out, Soviet-Turkish relations during this period were not without their difficulties and frictions. For example, in 1921 a rumour was spread, that Russian troops were massing in Transcaucasia for an attack on Turkey, and this rumour gained some credence in Turkish ruling circles, for "among the Kemalists themselves there were elements which consciously strove to prevent the strengthening of Soviet-Turkish relations". But, these authors assert, "the firm desire of both states to preserve friendly relations, and the Turkish leaders' understanding of the paramount importance of good-neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union, overcame the difficulties which arose in these years".

But if, as these writers admit, there was an anti-Soviet group in Turkey during this period, there was also an anti-Kemalist group in Russia. Soviet views on Kemal Ataturk and his movement have by now attained a cautious equilibrium, but at the beginning of the movement sharply opposite views were canvassed in the Soviet Union.* For example, in MODERN TURKEY (1923) Arslan condemned the movement as "fascist", whereas G. Astakhov, in FROM SULTANATE TO DEMOCRATIC TURKEY (1926) firmly labelled it "progressive". Again, appearances of ideological solidarity between Ankara and Moscow - for example, the almost Communist-sounding wording of Kemal's early messages to the Soviet leaders - counted for little in Soviet estimation in the light of the murder "by Kemalist gendarmes" of the Turkish Communist leader Mustafa Subhi on 21st January 1921, and the subsequent suppression of the Turkish Communist Party. Kemal's treatment of the Turkish Communists, while it did not disturb Soviet-Turkish relations at the time, had an evident effect on the Soviet ideological assessment of the Kemalist regime. The present Soviet reaction to Nasir's treatment of the UAR Communists affords an obvious parallel.

The current Soviet assessment of the Kemalist regime takes account of both errors and virtues. The first thing in the Kemalists' favour is that they conducted an "objectively revolutionary struggle" for national liberation against the Entente powers (B.M. Dantsig, MODERN TURKEY, Moscow 1958, pp. 135-8). The principal moving force of this struggle, says Dantsig, was the peasantry, and the working class also took an active part in it; but, owing to the small numbers of the latter and its lack of political organization, the national bourgeoisie - for the most part, the trading bourgeoisie - assumed leadership of the national liberation movement. Thus the movement tended more and more to promote the interests of the bourgeoisie and, where these clashed with the interests of the peasantry and working masses, to oppose the latter. In MODERN HISTORY OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE NON-SOVIET EAST (1954) A.F. Miller gives an account of how the) Kemalists suppressed the

* For a fuller account of Soviet views at this period, see W.Z. Laqueur, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST, London 1959.

Turkish Communist Party and destroyed peasant partisan groups fighting for the cause of agrarian reform, and observes:

> "The suppression of the anti-feudal class struggle of the peasantry and the struggle of the Kemalists against the working class put a brake on the growth of the national liberation movement and gave it a limited and bourgeois character. But in the historical circumstances of Turkey at that time, and given the existing correlation of class forces, the Kemalist revolution despite all its negative aspects nevertheless had an objectively progressive national liberation character."

But this does not prevent the author of the next chapter in this work, E.F. Ludshuveyt, from making the following sweeping denunciation of the Kemalists:

> "Mortally afraid of the people of their own country, the Kemalists in the most cruel manner suppressed the slightest manifestations of the democratic movement, not to mention the class struggle of the workers and peasants. The Kemalists ruthlessly stamped upon the liberation movement of the non-Turkish nationalities. The exploiting nature of the Kemalists' rule inevitably led them to make common cause with the compradors and landlords."

Thus here again we have an instance of the dual Soviet attitude towards modern Turkey. It is not surprising that, as if to account for their own inconsistency, Soviet writers on Turkey detect a contradiction in the nature of the Kemalist movement itself. In KOMUNIST No. 3 of 1959 A.F. Miller gives the following reply to a correspondent who has asked "why Turkey, having in the 1920s followed an independent foreign policy, supported peace and opposed colonialism, has now become a bulwark of imperialism in the Near East".

> "Such an amazing change was neither accidental nor sudden... From the beginning the Turkish bourgeois nationalists had a dual character. They possessed both progressive and reactionary tendencies... The progressive side...was the fight for national independence, against colonialism and the feudal-clerical and comprador circles which helped the imperialists. The reactionary tendency showed itself in the fact that these forces, desiring to establish a bourgeois independent state, tried to ensure in it the domination of the national bourgeoisie and exclusive privileges for it, were steeped in nationalistic narrow-mindedness and chauvinism, opposed socialism, and acted against the vital needs of the workers and peasants, against the interests of national minorities, and against the democratization of the social system."

The War and the Straits The deterioration in Soviet-Turkish relations which began in the years immediately preceding the second World War is noted and deplored by Soviet writers. To explain Turkey's less friendly attitude they say that in the mid-30s the Turkish bourgeoisie intensified its economic and political oppression of the working class, and itself came increasingly under the influence of extreme reactionary circles, which were hostile to the Soviet Union and wanted friendly relations with both Germany and the Anglo-French bloc. Moiseyev and Rozaliyev complain that during the war Turkey signed a pact of friendship with Germany "three days before Germany's attack on the USSR", supplied Germany with strategic raw materials, and allowed German armed troop transports to pass through the Straits in violation of the Montreux Convention. However, Soviet writers make no mention of the hostility shown by the Soviet Union towards Turkey at the close of the war - the Soviet demands made in 1945 for the return to Russia of the Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan and for a revision of the Montreux Convention which would permit Russia to share in the defence of the Straits.

Little Soviet material is available which illustrates the Soviet attitude to the Straits question. Since the regime of the Straits is governed by the Montreux Convention of 1936, one may find some enlightenment in the Soviet attitude towards the Montreux Conference and Convention. The regime set up by the Lausanne Treaty is, of course, categorically denounced in Soviet histories as constituting a threat to the security of the Soviet Union, and Turkey is blamed as having accepted without resistance a British draft treaty which contravened the interests of the Black Sea states. What is more surprising, however, is that the Turkish attitude at the Montreux Conference is equally denounced by Soviet writers. After all, the Turkish draft presented to that conference also embodied Russia's requirements, and indeed, as A.J. Toynbee has said (SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1936), "it is more than probable that the draft...was the result of Turco-Soviet collaboration". During the conference, it is true, the Soviet press complained on occasion that Turkey was "yielding to the pressure of the imperialist powers"; but the Soviet Union had Turkey to thank more than anyone else for the results of the conference, in which, again in Toynbee's words, "Russia attained all her main objects".

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union clearly does not regard the Straits question as finally settled to its complete satisfaction. In MODERN TURKEY (1958) B.M. Dantsig says: "The Convention of Montreux in comparison with that of Lausanne improved the regime of the Straits to a certain extent." The demands made in 1945, and in particular the demand that the Straits should be open to warships of the Black Sea powers, only, in wartime as in peacetime, no doubt reflect the USSR's experience in 1941-5, when in the words of the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia "the Montreux Convention was repeatedly violated by the Turkish Government to the advantage of the fascist powers". Perhaps the annoyance shown by Soviet writers at Turkey's past attitude in the Straits question reflects this feeling that Soviet demands have not yet been fully met.

Turkey's post-war foreign policy In the Soviet view the turning-point in Turkey's post-war foreign policy was her acceptance of military aid from the USA in 1947, followed by the Marshall aid agreement of 1948 and Turkey's accession to NATO in 1952. In the words of A.F. Miller (KOMMUNIST No.3 of 1959) "Turkey, contrary to her national interests, joined the imperialist system headed by the USA in the capacity of an economically and politically dependent auxiliary". But is Turkey's choice of the Western alliance regarded in Soviet eyes as irreversible? Presumably not, to judge by Khrushchev's statements quoted above and by Soviet writings; Miller also says that "in a calm situation and without outside interference there would be no difficulty in coming to an agreement on all questions of Soviet-Turkish relations". How then do the Russians visualize this situation as coming about - as a result of a change of heart by the present Turkish Government, or of a change of Government within the present regime, or of the overthrow of the regime by a revolutionary Government?

At the time of the improvement in Soviet-US relations following Khrushchev's visit to the USA (MIZAN NEWSLETTER Vol. 1, No. 11, pp.9-10) the Soviet press represented the Turkish leaders as hostile to any Soviet-US rapprochement and as warning the US leaders "not to trust the Communists". IZVESTIYA said that the Turkish leaders, committed to a policy of positions of strength, "cannot find their place in the newly arisen international political situation". A leading article in INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS of Octover 1959 suggested that alliance with the USA was compatible with friendship with the USSR: "the Soviet people hope that improved US-Soviet relations will, in turn, help to normalize the relations of the USSR with all countries that are allied to the USA." But better relations between the USSR and countries allied to the USA, in the Soviet view, might bring about political changes in those countries: "the only ones who have reason to be apprehensive about the dispelling of hostility between the USSR and the USA are those who derive immediate gain out of the cold war, those who are so committed to this policy that its failure would mean their political bankruptcy." A Soviet reader would understand this as intended to include, among others, the leaders of Turkey.

Republican People's Party criticism of the Turkish Government has, where appropriate to the Soviet theme, been freely quoted in Soviet newspapers and publications. The RPP has sometimes been represented as more pro-Soviet; for example, the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia quotes Inonu as deploring the deterioration of Turkish-Soviet relations. But Soviet writers are not prepared to concede that, from an ideological point of view, there is any substantial difference between the Turkish parties; "all these parties", says A.F. Miller, "are equally hostile to the popular masses".

Nevertheless, there is not the wholesale condemnation of the present regime in Turkey which one might expect if the Russians had altogether given up hopes of reaching a satisfactory accommodation with it. At the

same time, on the ideological plane, Soviet writers insist that the most pro-Soviet forces in Turkey are the working proletariat, and - without suggesting that they are likely to overthrow the present regime - they make a close study of "democratic" and "progressive" forces in Turkey and, in particular, of working-class movements.

(Next issue: "Government and People")

PERSIAN OIL TODAY: A SOVIET PICTURE

The fifth anniversary of the Persian oil agreement of 1954 has been recalled by articles in NEW TIMES (No. 45 of 1959) and INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (No. 12 of 1959). In his article in INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS M. Ivanov denounces the agreement as having brought upon Persia not only economic ruin but also political and indeed national servitude. He says that the consequences of the agreement have been "the pillage of Iran's main national wealth, oil, and the brutal exploitation of Iranian oil workers" and also "the practical abolition of Iranian sovereignty over the territory in which the consortium operates and also, in large measure, subordination of the country's entire economic life to the will of the imperialist monopolies". He also says that the agreement has had disastrous political consequences for Persia, since it was soon followed by Persia's accession to the Baghdad Pact and her abandonment of the policy of neutrality. Ivanov's article is a mixture of condemnation of the terms of the agreement, allegations that provisions favouring Persia have been violated, and quotations from Persian press reports, as well as some Western accounts, which fit in with the Soviet picture of a suffering and exploited people.

Of the agreement itself, Ivanov says that "the two large companies it set up...operate in a territory which exceeds the one formerly controlled by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company". The National Iranian Oil Company, he says, is "merely a screen for covering up the true nature of the activities of foreign oil companies in Iran", since it figures nominally as the owner of installations and refineries and in fact is "entirely barred from any control over the extraction, refining and marketing of oil". Ivanov represents the NIOC as being itself exploited by the consortium; he says that the consortium has tried to make it pay the insurance premiums on the oil installations, as being the owner of them; and he says that since under Article 17 the NIOC is responsible for the provision of health services and other "non-basic operations", it is therefore "not surprising that the NIOC bears great losses". Americans, he says, not only control the consortium but also in fact control the activities of the NIOC. The Shah himself, he says, admitted in July 1959 that "the agreement concluded in 1954 has many flaws".

Ivanov alleges that the agreement itself is being broken by the consortium:

"Taking advantage of the involved and hazy formulations of the agreement, the consortium seeks to evade the fulfilment of its obligations. For example, it is systematically violating Article 23, which provides that 12.5 per cent of the extracted oil shall be placed at the disposal of Iran. To preserve the monopoly in marketing Iranian oil, the consortium is hampering Iran in the sale of her share of the oil and in this way is compelling her to hand over her entire share to the consortium companies."

Further, Ivanov alleges, the consortium cut the selling price of Persian oil without preliminary notification to the Persian Government, contrary to the terms of the agreement. The resulting slump in oil revenues, he says, has prevented the construction of hospitals and schools which had been budgeted for in 1959-1960.

Ivanov concludes his article with a grim picture of the living conditions of Persian workers in the oil industry. He says that they are paid starvation wages, and live in "filthy clay huts" without windows, water or sanitation, and that the consortium is dismissing workers wholesale without any compensation, having dismissed as many as 1,500 in one month; the oil workers have gone on strike several times, but the Persian authorities under pressure from the consortium declared the strikes illegal and introduced the death penalty for persons provoking strikes in the oil enterprises.

Persia's way out of this situation, says Ivanov, is "to abolish the economic and political grip of the imperialists and to use the country's huge natural resources, oil in the first place, in the interests of the Iranian people". This is the basic contention of Soviet writings on the subject of Middle East oil (MIZAN NEWSLETTER Vol. 1, No. 6, pp.6-10); the demand for national ownership and control of oil resources is presented as being essentially the demand of the working people of the countries concerned. This is particularly the case in V.S. Baskin's account of Persian oil nationalization, in THE OIL MONOPOLIES IN THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST (1957); Baskin says that the bourgeois support of the nationalization movement was largely opportunist and self-interested. However, the opposition to the consortium today is presented by Soviet writers as a movement of all classes. In his NEW TIMES article P. Yaminsky quotes one Persian Majlis member as saying that he was "cruelly mistaken" in the hopes he had placed in the consortium, and another as saying that "Iran's oil must belong to Iran, and all the affairs of the oil industry must be conducted in conformity with the demands and rights of the Iranian people".

Persian Oil 1947-1952

A new Soviet account of the events leading up to the nationalization of Persian oil and the rupture of diplomatic relations with Britain in 1952 is contributed by A.K. Lavrent'yev to a symposium of Persian studies in KRATKIYE SOOBSHCHENIYA INSTITUTA VOSTOKOVEDENIYA XXXVI, under the title "The liquidation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company". Lavrent'yev says of the nationalization of Persian oil that it "dealt an irreparable blow to British colonial policy in the whole of the Near and Middle East", and of the rupture of diplomatic relations with Britain that it was "an unprecedented event in relations between an under-developed semi-dependent state and a great colonial power". He asks how this was possible; "what enabled Persia to achieve such remarkable successes in the national liberation struggle?" The answer, he says, lay in the unity of the national bourgeoisie, working class and intelligentsia in the National Front, with the Tudeh Party rallying the workers, peasants, intelligentsia and artisans. In this situation "the Government of the national bourgeoisie was in many cases obliged to act just as the broadest masses of the people wanted it to". However, "true to its traditions and class allegiance", the national bourgeoisie abandoned its allies and the split in the National Front led to the overthrow of the Government, when representatives of the big bourgeoisie came to power.

SOVIET ANGLE ON THE NEWS

Below are reviewed reports on Middle East events appearing in Soviet newspapers and periodicals during the period 8th January - 6th February.

The Aswan High Dam Soviet newspapers published lengthy Tass reports and correspondents' dispatches on the ceremonies held in Aswan on 9th January to mark the beginning of work on the first stage of the High Dam. PRAVDA published a two-column report of President Nasir's speech in which he expressed the Egyptian people's gratitude for the USSR's help. In an IZVESTIYA dispatch (8.1.60) Kondrashov said that the West had hoped to turn the High Dam project to its advantage in the spring of 1959, when "Soviet-UAR relations had been complicated by the anti-Communist campaign started by Cairo"; but Moscow had kept its word and punctually fulfilled its commitments, "leaving the settlement of ideological controversies to history".

The news that the USSR was also to undertake the construction of the second stage of the High Dam was given in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA on 21st January, accompanied by long dispatches from Belyayev and Kondrashov respectively giving an account of the enthusiastic and grateful reactions

of the Egyptian press and public. Both correspondents noted that the Egyptian journalist Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal had praised the Soviet Union for "scrupulously fulfilling its obligations and behaving towards the Arabs as a friend". (In February 1959 PRAVDA sharply attacked Haykal for anti-Communist writings, alleging that he was pro-American - see MIZAN NEWSLETTER Vol. 1, No. 3, p.8).

The licensing of Iraqi political parties The law permitting resumption of political party activity in Iraq, and the applications of three parties to be licensed - the National Democratic, Communist and Kurdish Democratic Parties - have received little notice in the Soviet press. The following comment on the new law was published in NEW TIMES No. 2 of 1960:

> "The promulgation of the new law testifies to the stability of the republican regime, whose leaders have the support of the people. There is a tendency in some Asian and African countries to curtail democratic rights and restrict the political activity of the working people...All the experience of the national liberation movement shows that curtailment of the people's rights is more often than not attended by attempts to rig up a deal with the imperialists to the detriment of the national interest.
>
> "The Iraqi Republic was brought into being by an uprising of the army supported by the people. And the people have played a decisive part in suppressing anti-republican plots and insurrections. The present legalization of patriotic parties and organizations will enable the people to play a still more active part in strengthening Iraqi independence and accelerating the solution of major social and economic problems in the interests of Iraq's continued progress."

The World Islamic Conference in Jerusalem TRUD of 24th January published an article by G. Kuznetsov attacking Sayyid Ramadan, the General Secretary of the World Muslim Congress and organiser of its conference which opended in Jerusalem on 26th January. At a recent press conference in Tehran, said Kuznetsov, Sayyid Ramadan had announced the formation of a "united pan-Islamic front for struggle against Communism, materialism and atheism", and had affirmed that Communism was "an enemy of the sacred Muslim religion and of the independence and integrity of the Muslim countries". Such "ravings" scarely deserved an answer, Kuznetsov observed; everyone knew that the USSR, like all the socialist countries, believed in the principles of peaceful co-existence and non-interference in the affairs of other peoples.

The real inspiration behind Sayyid Ramadan's anti-Communism, said Kuznetsov, could be seen from an article in ECHO D'IRAN of 19th September, which spoke of the formation of a "powerful united religious front" as being also an objective of the Pope and of Western Governments - in other words, an imperialist-Catholic-Muslim alliance directed against the liberation movement of the eastern peoples. "Playing on the religious feelings of backward people, they try to undermine this powerful movement of today and to bind the Muslim countries firmly to the military and political chariot of the West."

Issued by the Central Asian Research Centre
in association with
St. Antony's College (Oxford) Soviet Affairs Study Group